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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l e e , 
v s . 
CHARLOTTE MARLENE LONGSHAW, 
D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t . 
B R I E F OF APPELLANT LONGSHAW 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h i s ma t t e r pursuant t o 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in 
Denying the Defendant's Motion for New Trial on 
the Basis that the Statements Made by the 
Prosecution During Closing Arguments were 
Substantial and Prejudicial to the Extent that 
there is a Reasonable Likelihood that in their 
Absence There Would Have Been a More Favorable 
Result. 
Standard of Review: In determining whether or not a 
statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct: 
Case NO.960746-CA 
Priority No. 2 
The statement must be viewed in light of the 
totality of the evidence presented at trial. 
Further, because the trial court is in the best 
position to determine the impact of a statement upon 
the proceedings, its rulings on whether the 
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992). 
Preservation in Trial Court: This matter was preserved in 
the trial court upon objection of defense counsel during the 
State's closing argument. (R. at 001651). 
II. There Was Insufficient Evidence Upon Which to 
Convict the Defendant of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder, a First Degree Felony. 
Standard of Review: When examining the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a criminal jury trial the threshold issue of 
statutory interpretation is decided as a matter of law. See 
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d at 1313 (Utah App. 1993). With regard 
to the facts, the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. This Court will review 
a conviction when the evidence, viewed in light of the court's 
interpretation of the statute, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which she was convicted. See State v. Johnson, 
821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Determinative case law in this matter includes: State of 
Utah v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848 (Ut. App. 1992) which discusses 
the matter of prosecutorial misconduct and State of Utah v. 
Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1989) which discusses the 
definition of mental state for manslaughter and voluntary 
intoxication. 
Determinative statutes include Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-203 
which sets forth the elements for first degree murder and 
states in pertinent part that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the 
actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another commits an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of 
another;. . • 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 sets forth the definition for 
manslaughter and reads in pertinent part that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if 
the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for 
which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse; or 
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(c)causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally justifiable 
or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional disturbance 
does not include a condition resulting from mental 
illness as defined in Section 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse 
under Subsection (1)(b), or the reasonable belief of 
the actor under Subsection (1) (c) , shall be 
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
under the then existing circumstances. 
(4) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-207 sets forth the elements for the 
crime of negligent homicide and states that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide 
if the actor, acting with criminal negligence, 
causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ms. Longshaw, the appellant, was charged with one count 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony on or 
about April 10, 1995. The charge arose from actions that took 
place at the Memorial Estates Funeral Home at 6500 South 1700 
West in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on that same day. Ms 
Longshaw was attending the funeral of her brother, Aaron 
Greuber, when a fight broke out between Terry D. Stewart, and 
Ms. Longshaw's brother, John Sloan. Ms. Longshaw was in 
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possession of a firearm which she took out in trying to end 
the fight. One shot was fired which resulted in the death of 
Terry D. Stewart- As the evidence at trial showed, and as will 
be discussed in greater detail below, at the time of the 
incident Ms. Longshaw had been taking Valium and Soma in 
rather large quantities and was suffering from extreme 
emotional distress. 
This matter went to trial on or about May 21, 1996. This 
matter was tried to a jury and a verdict of guilty of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, was handed down on or 
about May 30, 1996. Ms. Longshaw was sentenced before the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on or about July 22, 1996. She was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life at 
the Utah State Prison. She was further ordered to pay full 
restitution. (R. at 000211) . A timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed in this matter on or about July 30, 1996. (R. at 
000213). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 10, 1995 Ms. Longshaw was charged with 
one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony. 
(R. at 000008). These charges arose out of actions that took 
place that same day at the Memorial Estates Funeral Home at 
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6500 South 1700 West in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The 
funeral that was taking place that day was for Ms. Longshaw's 
brother, Aaron Greuber. Aaron had died on April 3, 1995. (R. 
at 001094). Mr. Greuber's death was discovered when his wife, 
Terresa Greuber called Ms. Longshaw's mother, Dorothy Greuber 
and asked if she had seen Aaron. (R. at 001095). Terresa and 
Aaron had been fighting and Terresa was not staying with Aaron 
at the time. (Id.) After the call, Mrs. Greuber asked her 
daughter Marlene Longshaw, the defendant/appellant to go by 
Aaron's home and check on him. When Marlene went to check on 
her brother she found him lying on the floor dead. (Id.) 
Over the course of the next few days the family began to 
make funeral arrangements. During this time period there was 
a lot of animosity between Terresa Greuber and Aaron Greuber's 
family. Aaron's family felt that Terresa may have had 
something to do with Aaron's death and there were numerous 
antagonistic phone calls between the parties during this 
initial period. (R. at 001257). In making the funeral 
arrangements, Daniel Hernandez, the funeral director, 
initially contacted Dorothy Greuber. (R. at 000278). Mrs. 
Greuber immediately turned the arrangements over to the 
appellant, Marlene. (Id.) During this initial contact, Mr. 
6 
Hernandez discovered that Aaron was married and he informed 
the Greuber family that Aaron's wife was the person he should 
be speaking with. Marlene informed Mr. Hernandez of the 
conflict that was present between the families and that if 
they were to make the arrangements they did not want Terresa 
present while the arrangements were being made.(R. at 000279). 
Mr. Hernandez then contacted Terresa Greuber and made an 
appointment with her to begin making arrangements. (Id.) In 
speaking with Terresa, Mr. Hernandez was informed that she did 
not want Aaron's family involved and that she wanted to make 
the arrangements herself. However, she also informed Mr. 
Hernandez that she did not have the money for the funeral and 
she wanted the Greuber's to pay for it. (R. at 000280-81). 
When Hernandez informed Terresa that if the Greuber's were to 
pay for the funeral she could not leave them out of it, 
Terresa said she would find another way to pay. (Id.) 
Ultimately, Terresa was unable to pay for the funeral and she 
decided to allow the Greuber's to make the arrangements and 
pay for the funeral. (R. at 000283-84). At this point, Marlene 
made all of the funeral arrangements. Mr. Hernandez testified 
that Marlene was the person who attempted to keep the family 
under control and to not let the animosity towards Terresa get 
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out of hand. She included Terresa in the obituary and never 
tried to exclude her from the funeral itself. (R. at 000285). 
On Sunday evening, April 9, 1995 a viewing was held at 
the Memorial Estates Funeral Home. (R. at 000287). The 
testimony at trial was that the defendant, Marlene Longshaw, 
was very distraught and upset at the viewing. More so than she 
had ever been in the past. (R. at 001098). Further, according 
to Dorothy Greuber, Marlene was taking Valium the night of the 
viewing. (Id.) During the viewing, Terresa Greuber showed up 
with various members of her family, including her stepfather 
Terry Stewart. Mrs. Greuber, along with other members of the 
Greuber family reported that Terry Stewart was carrying a gun 
under his overcoat that night and that Mrs. Greuber, along 
with many of the children and others that attended the viewing 
had seen the gun and were-frightened. (R. at 001100, 001379, 
001396 and 001425). It was also testified to that when Terry 
Stewart approached the coffin of Aaron Greuber he commented 
that "he doesn't look so tough now/' (R. at 001352). This 
comment was reported to Marlene who was apparently very upset. 
(R. at 001353) . 
After the viewing as a result of the gun seen on Terry 
Stewart and the comments that had been reported, Dorothy 
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Greuber held a family meeting. (R. at 001103) . During the 
meeting the family discussed how to make sure that everyone 
was safe during the funeral. They assigned each child to an 
adult so that if there was a problem of any kind the adults 
could get the children out of the room. (Id.) They discussed 
what had taken place at the viewing, and further, Mrs. Greuber 
called the police to report the sighting of the gun at the 
viewing. (R. at 001104). The police told her if there was any 
further trouble to call back. (R. at 001105). At no time did 
any member of the family discuss taking firearms to the 
funeral. (Id.) 
The funeral took place on Monday, April 10, 1995. There 
was testimony from various individuals that Marlene was 
terribly distraught at the funeral and her grief exceeded 
anything they had ever seen before. The testimony was 
undisputed that Marlene spent the entire hour prior to the 
beginning of the funeral laying on top of the body of her dead 
brother Aaron. (R. at 000298, 001107 & 001225). Further, 
Marlene kept telling people at the funeral to "just put me in 
with him and close the casket so I can go with him." (R. at 
001107 & 001399). The funeral itself was scheduled to begin at 
2:00 p.m. (R. at 000287). At approximately ten minutes before 
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2:00 the family prayer began. (R. at 000299). As the family 
prayer was ending, just prior to the funeral, Terresa Greuber 
and her family, including Terry Stewart, and three or four 
other individuals arrived at the funeral. (R. at 000299, 
001225) . After entering the room, Terresa proceeded towards 
the casket while the remainder of her family stayed in the 
back of the room near the door. (R. at 000305). Just prior to 
Terresa approaching the casket, Marlene finally stepped away 
from her brother's body. (R. at 000309). It was at this point 
that chaos begin to break out in the room. Marlene's daughter 
Dorothy Longshaw, who was about fourteen at the time, and 
Terresa Greuber began a shouting match which escalated into a 
fight between the two women. (R. at 001227). At this time 
shouting began in the back of the room. John Sloan, who is 
Marlenefs older brother, turned to Terry Stewart and said "you 
got a big mouth". (R. at 000312). Mr. Sloan also said "let's 
go out in the parking lot and settle it". (R. at 000313). At 
this time a fight broke out between John Sloan and Terry 
Stewart. (R. at 000314). Mr. Stewart was dressed in a long 
western type top coat or slicker type rain coat when he 
entered the room and was still wearing the coat when the fight 
broke out. (Id.) At this point the entire room erupted into a 
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fight. (R. at 000316). According to the testimony, Marlene's 
mother, Dorothy Greuber somehow got involved in the fight 
between John Sloan and Terry Stewart. At one point, Terry 
Stewart had Mrs. Greuber in a head lock. (R. at 001230). Lane 
Arson, who testified at trial, testified that he broke up the 
fight between Stewart and Mrs. Greuber and then Stewart 
proceeded to fight again with John Sloan. (Id.) Mr. Lane then 
attempted to break up the fight between Stewart and Sloan. (R. 
at 001231) . 
According to the testimony of Daniel Hernandez, the 
funeral director, at this point the room was in total chaos. 
"Pictures were flying, flowers were flying, it was chaos. 
There was little kids screaming, everybody, I could hardly 
hear myself think." (R. at 000317). It was then that Hernandez 
saw the defendant, Marlene, standing in the middle of the room 
with a gun. (Id.) According to the testimony of Michael Moore, 
he saw Marlene with the gun and hollered at her to put it down 
to which she responded "I will". (R. at 001357). However, Mr. 
Moore testified that Marlene was a mess at this point. He 
testified that she was so torn up, that in the twenty years he 
had known her, he had never seen her like this. (R. at 
001359). Bonnie Thackeray, the assistant funeral director 
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testified that when she saw Marlene with the gun she 
approached her and said "Marlene". She testified that she was 
surprised because Marlene did not seem to know who she was and 
did not respond in any way. She further testified that 
Marlene's eyes looked glassy and she was moving towards the 
fight between her brother and Terry Stewart. (R. at 000506). 
She testified that she heard Marlene say "back off" two or 
three times and that she appeared to be saying this to Terry 
Stewart. (Id.) At this point, Ms. Thackeray testified that she 
left the room. (R. at 0005007) . Mr. Arson testified that as he 
was attempting to break up the fight between Sloan and 
Stewart, Marlene approached them from behind on his left side. 
(R. at 001232). He testified that Marlene grabbed a hold of 
Terry Stewart's coat and shortly thereafter he heaird a gun 
shot and felt the powder or the muzzle blast on his hip. (R. 
at 001233). According to Mr. Arson, Marlene was maybe a foot 
and a half away from Stewart when the gun went off. (Id.) At 
this point Terry Stewart fell to the ground. (Id.) According 
to the testimony of Alicia Patrick, Marlene's sister, after 
Terry Stewart fell to the ground his family surrounded him. 
She further testified that his wife, Kathy Turnbow, and his 
stepson, Troy Turnbow, appeared to be removing things from his 
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pockets. After this Troy Turnbow began taking purses and 
running out to a truck in the parking lot. (R. at 001409). 
Dorothy Greuber also testified that while she was waiting in 
the parking lot after the shooting she saw Troy Turnbow run 
through the parking lot numerous times with a purse in his 
hands and then he would return to the funeral home without it 
coming back shortly thereafter with another purse. (R. at 
0001110). 
According to Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner the 
gunshot wound suffered by Mr. Stewart was in the "right lower 
lateral chest region" and was classified as an "indeterminate 
range wound". (R. at 000748) . He further testified that: 
The wound path went through the skin and struck one 
of the ribs causing a break in the right 7th rib. It 
then perforated the muscles we breathe with, which 
is the diaphragm, caused an injury across the top of 
the liver, went back through the diaphragm and 
struck the right lung more towards the middle of the 
chest. It then struck the heart causing a grazing 
injury to the back of the heart. It struck the 
aorta, which is the major vessel that supplies blood 
to our body, went through the left lung and then 
passed between the left third and fourth ribs and 
came to rest before it could exit the skin. 
(R. at 000749). The weapon that Marlene used was a .22 caliber 
revolver. (R. at 000786). 
Norman Longshaw, Marlene's husband, testified that the 
firearm used by Marlene belonged to them. He testified that it 
13 
was kept locked in the basement and that Marlene had never 
carried a gun or even handled one to his knowledge prior to 
this day. (R. at 001487). He further testified that he did not 
know she had the gun with her at the funeral until he saw her 
take it out when the fight broke out. (R. at 001488). After 
the shooting Marlene left the funeral home and went to the 
parking lot. Mr. Longshaw testified that he waited in the 
parking lot with her until the police arrived. While in the 
parking lot he asked his wife if she realized what she had 
just done and she just looked at him with a blank stare. (R. 
at 001489). At this point he just handed her a cigarette. 
(Id.) 
Shortly thereafter a number of police officers began to 
arrive. According to the testimony of Officer Richard Davis 
when he arrived at the scene he proceeded inside and saw the 
body of Stewart. He then located Terry Stewart's wife, Kathy 
Turnbow, and asked who had shot her husband. She told him that 
it was Marlene. (R. at 0000882). At this point Officer Davis 
went out to the parking lot and began to ask who Marlene was. 
Ms. Longshaw raised her hand and said "I'm Marlene". She then 
put out the cigarette, lifted up her shirt and showed him the 
revolver sticking out of her pants and said "is this what you 
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are looking for?" (R. at 0000883-884). For purposes of safety, 
Officer Davis drew his weapon and instructed Marlene to lie 
down on the ground. She did this at which point Corporal Tom 
Hill arrived and handcuffed her and seized the revolver. (Id.) 
According to Officer Davis, Marlene was compliant the entire 
time. (R. at 000901). 
Ms. Longshaw was arrested and taken to the police station 
by Officer Dan Gallagher. Once at the station Officer 
Gallagher did gun shot residue tests and then began to 
interview Marlene. (R. at 001001, 001003). During the 
interview Marlene told him that she had seen a gun the night 
before at the viewing. (R. at 001011). She also stated that 
when the fight broke out at the funeral between her brother 
and Mr. Stewart that she grabbed Mr. Stewart in an attempt to 
pull him away from her brother. (R. at 001014). Officer 
Gallagher testified that at this point he did not know the 
condition of Mr. Stewart, and Ms. Longshaw did not know that 
Stewart was dead. (R. at 001028). The interview with Ms. 
Longshaw continued until Officer Gallagher received a phone 
call from Marlene's counsel requesting that the interview 
stop. ( R. at 001077). 
15 
Marlene Longshaw was convicted of the charge of first 
degree murder on or about May 30, 1996 and was sentenced to a 
term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The prosecutor in this matter made statements during the 
rebuttal portion of his closing argument which incorrectly 
stated the law. In discussing voluntary intoxication the 
prosecutor told the jury that if they found the defendant was 
voluntarily intoxicated they could not find her guilty of 
either manslaughter or negligent homicide. (R. at 0001651-52) . 
Defense counsel objected to this statement and the court 
instructed the jury to follow the jury instructions. However, 
after the court's instruction the prosecution again misstated 
the law and repeated to the jury that if the defendant was 
voluntarily intoxicated they could not return verdict of 
either manslaughter or negligent homicide. 
The statements of the prosecutor in his closing argument 
violate the two part test set forth in State v. Valdez, 513 
P.2d 422 (Utah 1973). The remarks called the attention of the 
jurors to a matter that they would not be justified in 
considering in determining their verdict and this error was 
substantial and prejudicial to such a degree that there is a 
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reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have 
been a more favorable result. 
There was insufficient evidence in this matter to convict 
the defendant of first degree murder. First degree murder is 
defined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 which sets forth the 
elements which the state must prove. In order to be convicted 
of first degree murder the state must prove that the defendant 
acted with either the intent to kill, the intent to commit 
serious bodily injury, or depraved indifference. The state did 
not prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Rather, the evidence showed overwhelmingly that Ms. Longshaw 
was acting under severe emotional distress the day of the 
shooting. It further showed that she suffers from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder and on the day of the shooting she 
had taken large quantities of Valium and Soma causing her to 
be intoxicated. This evidence supported a verdict of 
manslaughter. There was also ample evidence that the defendant 
was acting negligently and may have been guilty of negligent 
homicide or that she was acting in self defense and was not 
guilty of any crime. 
The evidence presented in this matter was sufficiently 
inconclusive and inherently improbable to such a degree that 
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Marlene Longshaw committed the crime of first degree murder. 
If the jury would have given proper consideration to the 
evidence in this matter they could not have reasonably 
convicted Ms. Longshaw of first degree murder and therefore 
this Court should overturn the verdict of the jury in this 
matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error in 
Denying the Defendant's Motion for New Trial on the 
Basis that the Statements Made by the Prosecution 
During Closing Arguments were Substantial and 
Prejudicial to the Extent that there is a Reasonable 
Likelihood that in their Absence There Would Have 
Been a More Favorable Result. 
A. Standard of Review: In determining whether or not a 
statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct: 
The statement must be viewed in light of the 
totality of the evidence presented at trial. 
Further, because the trial court is in the best 
position to determine the impact of a statement upon 
the proceedings, its rulings on whether the 
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992). 
B. Discussion: During the rebuttal portion of closing 
arguments in this case, the prosecuting attorney, Mr. Mike 
Christensen, made comments to the jury which incorrectly 
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stated the law. During closing arguments of the defense, 
defense counsel used a chart which set forth the elements of 
first degree murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide and self 
defense. This chart also included the state of mind which is 
required for each offense. The chart explained that in order 
to convict the defendant of first degree murder the jury must 
find either, intent to kill, intent to do serious bodily 
injury to another, or depraved indifference. (R. at 001620-
21). The chart went on to describe that in order to find the 
defendant guilty of manslaughter one must find a reckless 
disregard of the risk. Defense counsel then went on to read 
the court's instruction of reckless disregard to the jury. (R. 
at 001622) . The chart explained that to find the defendant 
guilty of negligent homicide there must be a finding a 
criminal negligence. Defense counsel then went on to read the 
court's instruction on criminal negligence to the jury. (R. at 
001623). 
Defense counsel then argued that if the jury decided that 
the defendant's conduct constituted a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk then they would have to decide between 
manslaughter and negligent homicide. Defense counsel then 
explained to the jury that where there is potential mental 
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illness or intoxication to the level that the defendant did 
not know the risk or did not perceive the risk and the jury 
finds it was a gross deviation for her not to realize that 
risk then they should find the defendant guilty of negligent 
homicide. (R. at 001625). 
In the state's rebuttal argument Mr. Christensen 
completely misstated the law as to voluntary intoxication and 
how that would affect a verdict of manslaughter or negligent 
homicide. In referring to the defendant's diagram, the 
following exchange took place: 
Mr. Christensen: Mr. Mooney fails on his diagram to 
mention what voluntary intoxication 
also does with regard to criminally 
negligent types of homicide. Basically 
it does away with negligent homicide 
all together. Even when your read the 
instruction on that- -
Mr. Mooney: I am going to object to that, your Honor. 
The Court: Excuse me? 
Mr. Mooney: I am going to object. That's not the law. 
Mr. Christensen: On the contrary, it is. 
The Court: Your Objection? 
Mr. Mooney: 
The Court 
My objection is the statement that's been 
made, it misrepresents the law. 
Members of the jury, as I have told you 
before, arguments of counsel and statements 
of counsel are not evidence in this matter. 
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You are to be governed by the law as 
provided to you and as read to you. If your 
interpretation of the law is different than 
what Mr. Christensen is arguing to you, you 
go by what is contained in the Jury 
Instructions. 
Mr. Christensen: Let's clear that up. Jury Instruction 
No. 18, I'll read it, 
"Voluntary intoxication shall not be a 
defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the 
mental state which is an element of the 
offense. However, if recklessness --" 
manslaughter here is recklessness — "or 
criminal negligence establishes an element 
of an offense and the actor is unaware of 
the risk because of involuntary 
intoxication, her awareness is immaterial 
for the prosecution for that offense." 
Again, ladies and gentlemen, I have 
correctly stated the law to you. And 
negligent homicide for voluntary 
intoxication doesn't apply. And the first 
element of manslaughter, her recklessness 
doesn't apply. 
(R. at 001651-52)1. As Mr. Christensen made this final 
statement he took defendant's chart and crossed off first 
"negligent homicide" and it's elements and secondly, 
"manslaughter" and its elements. In other words, the 
prosecutions comments to the jury were that if they found that 
1
 Defense counsel objected to Jury Instruction No. 18 %%to the 
extent that it indicates that intoxication can do away with the 
awareness of the risk, to the distinction between reckless and 
criminal negligence/' (R. at 001579). 
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Ms- Longshaw was voluntarily intoxicated then they could not 
find her guilty of either manslaughter or negligent homicide. 
This was a clear misstatement of the law which was substantial 
and prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of these statements there would 
have been a more favorable result. 
In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (1973), the Supreme 
Court of Utah established a two part test in reviewing alleged 
prejudicial remarks of counsel. The first consideration is 
whether or not the remarks call the attention of the jurors to 
matters they would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict. Once this first matter is 
established the court must then consider whether or not under 
the particular circumstances of the case the jurors were 
probably influenced by the improper remarks in reaching their 
verdict. See State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (1973). This test 
was more recently applied in the case of State v. Cummins, 839 
P.2d 848 (1992). In that matter the court held that the 
prosecution's statements constitute misconduct when: 
The actions or remarks of [prosecuting] counsel call 
to the attention of the jury a matter it would not 
be justified in considering in determining its 
verdict and, if so, under the circumstances of the 
particular case, whether the error is substantial 
and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable 
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been a more favorable result. 
Id. at 852. 
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clearly called the attention of the iurv * a matter, or legal 
conclusion that they would not be JUSLIIILJ .n considering i n 
determining their verdict. Mr. Christensen informed the jury 
both prior to defense counsel's objection, and again after the 
c o u r t' s i n s f, r i I c t j o n t h a t a r g i i m e n t o f c o i I n s e J i s i i E> t e v i d e n c e
 ilf 
that voluntary intoxication does away with the offenses of 
nc.gnuei .. . . . .4V. •. . ., '" . :s 
inaccurate statement of the law. Voluntary intoxication is not 
a defense to the crime of manslaughter or negligent homicide 
and shall not be considered unless the intoxication "negates 
the existence of th^ mental state which is an element of the 
o* ^ — • " I Jta h C( : - § ; 6 2 30 6 
P.2c 1 (Utah 1992), the Supreme Court held that voluntary 
i i I t o x i c a t j • E i I i n c „,. ;v b e • :i o i i side r e d w i i e i :i i It: a f f • = ::: t s 11 l e e x i s t e i I c e 
of tb<- mental stat^ which is an element of the offense. The 
court fteld tiidt i . i unis defense to be successful xhe 
defendant had to show more than that he had been drinking, 
xV[i]t was necessary to show that his mind had been affected to 
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requisite specific intent or purpose" to commit the crime. 
Wood at 90. 
In the matter at hand Ms. Longshaw had not been drinking 
prior to the funeral but had taken large quantities of Soma 
and Valium that morning. During the trial in this matter Dr. 
Steven N. Allen, who is a psychologist, testified as an expert 
regarding, in part, Ms. Longshaw's mental state at the time of 
the event. Regarding the substances that Ms. Longshaw has used 
prior to the funeral he testified as follows: 
Dr. Allen: Ms. Longshaw said that she didn't care 
about the funeral, about preparing for her 
brother's funeral. She said that she didn't 
dress and she didn't shower, which I take 
as to be signs of extreme distress, 
depression. She reported she hadn't been 
drinking prior to the funeral, but she had 
taken an estimated five or six Valium and 
two or three Soma medications before the 
funeral. 
Ms. Lewis: Could you describe taking five or six 
Valium and two or three Soma, wrhat that 
would do to a person? 
Dr. Allen: It would depend on the strength of the 
Valium, but that's a significant dose of 
Valium. That would likely significantly 
impair somebody's judgment and functioning, 
particularly if you combine that with Soma. 
(R. at 0011151-52). Dr. Allen concluded by testifying that: 
Based on all the information from the interview and 
from the assessment measures, I think that her 
mental state at the time of the shooting was 
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probably extremely distressed, I think she was 
probably thinking very poorly, probably was 
significantly impaired by Valium and Soma use. I 
think she was probably very distressed and depressed 
at the time of the funeral. 
: 
Although Ms. Longshaw did not appear to tell anyone 011 
the day of the funeral that she had been taking \ alium and 
Soma her husband, Norman Longshaw, testified that he was aware 
she had obtained these drugs prior to the funeral. (R. at 
001502). I n a d d i t :i « : »i 1 t : 1 1 :i : I c > n g s h a w' s a i 1 < :i D i A ] ] e i i s 
testimony, the testimony from other witnesses regarding Ms. 
someone using these types of drugs. Of particular importance 
is tn^ testimony of Bonnie Thackeray, the assistant funeral 
director. Ms. Thackeray testified that when Marlene had the 
gun she appeared glassy eyed and that when Ms. Thackeray tried 
to approach Mar leiu . md talk IM I KM Mm It in- did
 MM| respond 
and did not know who she was. (R. at 000505-507 
t e s t :i n: t : i I } - , ; 11 i. = i I : : i i: iJ:: :ii i I • = :i ; i :i t: 1: I ^ ] ] : f 11 i = t e s t i i i: i,c • i I ]
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Marlene's odd behavior throughout that day, particularly 
laying „^ K>„ w.jirjj to craw
 r,^_^ tuiKing to 
her dead brother for the entire hour before the funeral, 
supports the fact that she was taking Valium and Soma like she 
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reported and was voluntarily intoxicated. 
State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1989) also sets 
forth the proper reading of the law regarding voluntary 
intoxication. Like Wood, Padilla explains that although 
voluntary intoxication is not a defense is can be considered 
if the intoxication negates the existence of the mental state 
which is an element of the offense. Although Ms. Longshaw 
could not claim intoxication as a defense to manslaughter or 
negligent homicide and ask that the jury find her not guilty 
of these offenses based upon the fact she was intoxicated, the 
fact that she may have been intoxicated does not prevent her 
from further arguing that she may have also acted recklessly 
or with criminal negligence as opposed to with premeditation 
or depraved indifference. Further, the defendant clearly may 
argue that because of her intoxication she was not able to 
form the requisite intent of premeditation or depraved 
indifference and, in fact, her intoxication could serve as a 
basis for finding that the charged offense was not proven 
because the intent was not present. Mr. Christensen's 
statements to the jury, combined with him physically taking a 
marker and crossing off manslaughter and negligent homicide 
from defendant's state of mind exhibit, turned the law on its 
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that Ms. Longshaw was voluntarily intoxicated, then they must 
find her guilty 01 raider ii 1 tl le E 'irst Degree and not consider 
the lesser included offenses because one may not act 
recklessly or negligently if they are intoxicated. £ 
j: LI : < : -se 'C .1 itc r :i s 1 1 s = -r ji 1st :i f:i eci 2 1 1 1 1: 1 :i sstati 1 :L g tl le J a ; ; • : 1 : a 3 : g 1 :i i 1 1 3 
that the meaning of a Jury Instruction creates a result tnat 
is contrary to tl le . sidL< . , - - -^ ;, 
854 (Utah 1992) and State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 
1986) . Clearly the first prong of the test set forth in State 
hand. 
Secondly, on^^ it has be en G S LciLii^i.t 
prosecutor's remarks call to LIIO attention of the jury a 
matter it would not be justified in considering 3 n determining 
error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
1 e a s o 1 i a b 1 e J i k e ] :i 1 1 • > • i 1 1 1 a t: :i 1 :i ii t s a b s e n • : • • = t h e 1: E ; 1 : • 1 :i ] • :i 1 1 a E 
been a more favorab.e result. Under the facts of the case at 
hana mere u_. a SL- ..... I iJ i.-lihuud Lliai 11 I I in 1 11 1 In' 
prosecutor's remarks there would have been a more favorable 
result. In determining whether or not argument was prejudicial 
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this Court should "consider the entire record and 
circumstances of the case." State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 
(Utah 1986). In Andreason, the Supreme Court ruled that "[i]f 
proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, we will not presume 
the improper remark to be prejudicial. But in a case with less 
than compelling proof, we will more closely scrutinize the 
prosecutor's conduct." Id. In the matter at hand the issue was 
not whether or not Ms. Longshaw shot Mr. Stewart, but what her 
mental state was and under what circumstances she had shot 
him. The defense in this case was that she was not guilty of 
first degree murder but was guilty of either manslaughter or 
negligent homicide because of her mental state, or that she 
was acting in self defense. The evidence presented by the 
state that Ms. Longshaw acted with either intent to commit 
murder, intent to commit serious bodily harm, or with depraved 
indifference was almost non existent as will be discussed in 
more detail below. The evidence at trial did show that Ms. 
Longshaw was suffering from a mental illness, was intoxicated 
and was under extreme emotional distress at the time of the 
shooting. The evidence showed that although she may have acted 
negligently, and possibly recklessly she never acted with the 
intent to kill or to do serious bodily injury or with depraved 
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ability to recognize the effect of the mental state and *u 
convict her oi either manslaughter or negligent homicide. Tne 
facts left little question that Ms. Longshaw was in a state 01 
voluntary intoxication. The State even argued that this was 
the case Tl le rep^ w • • --'----' j mprcr- >• 
jury tc believe that ": ' they found M s . Longshaw was 
. ; , i • ^ ;.:,-._. ^.- L- i .. ... I: 1 , :i c t 1 i- E i: of ei tl lei 
of these lesser offenses when in fact, voluntary intoxication 
is a potential defense to E 'irst Degree murder. Given the 
evidence at trial a iurv believing that voluntary intoxication 
negates manslaughter or negligent homicide would be left 
degree murder. Because the prosecutor's misstatements 
c o i [ ip 1 e t e 1 y a i i • :i i i I c c r i e c 11 y i i e g a t e d M s . L o n g s h a w' s defense, 
combined with the lack of evidence that supported a conviction 
o-;
 Liist degree murder, i it: is clear that the statements were 
prejudicial and that without them there is a strong likelihood 
that M s . Longshaw would have been convicted of one ~ ^  x~"1_ ~ 
reverse the conviction entered in t:v : rial court in this 
matter, 
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II. There Was Insufficient Evidence Upon Which to 
Convict the Defendant of Criminal Homicidef Murder, 
a First Degree Felony. 
A. Standard of Review: When examining the sufficiency of 
the evidence in a criminal jury trial the threshold issue of 
statutory interpretation is decided as a matter of law. See 
State v. Souza, 846 P.2d at 1313 (Utah App. 1993). With regard 
to the facts, the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. This Court will review 
a conviction when the evidence, viewed in light of the court's 
interpretation of the statute, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which she was convicted. See State v. Johnson, 
821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992). 
B. Discussion: Ms. Longshaw was convicted of one count of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony. First Degree 
Murder is defined at Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-203 which sets 
forth the elements which must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt in order for the defendant to be convicted. Section 76-
5-203 reads in relevant part that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the 
actor: 
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of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury *<> 
another commits an act clearly dangerous 
human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death : f 
another; 
The trial court instructed the jury as 1 , the definition 
intentionally" ^n - 'knuw^ng^ 
court further instructed the iurv as L^ L ^ u^finition ^ 1 
serious bodily injury. (R. at 000142, 000143). Also, in Jury 
Inst" r ur<t i - ''I 1 1 ^ ji 11 t d^f i nod "depraved i n d i f f e r e n c e " 
as follows: 
(1) tl 1a t tl le defendant acted knowingly (2) 11 1 
creating a grave risk of death (3) knowing that the 
risk of death was grave, (4) which means a highly 
likely probability of death, and (5) that the 
conduct evidenced an utter callousness and 
indifference towards human .1 i fe 
(R. at 000144). The court further instructed that: 
k
 'Depraved niuiiieienue nieaiib d.. unti udiiuubntbb 
toward the value of human life and complete and 
total indifference as to whether one's conduct will 
create a grave risk of death to another. Thu^, <-< 
finding of depraved indifference must be based on an 
objective evaluation of the magnitude of the risk 
created and of all the circumstances surrounding the 
death. That: evaluation should focus on the gravity 
of the ri sk to human life that is created, the 
callousness of attitude toward that risk, and the 
lack of justification for the creation of the risk 
in the first place. In evaluating the evidence, the 
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jury should consider the following factors: (1) the 
utility of the defendant's conduct which caused the 
death; (2) the magnitude of the risk created by the 
defendant's conduct; (3) the defendant's knowledge 
of the risk; and (4) any precaution taken by the 
defendant to minimize the risk. 
(R. at 000145) . The prosecution argued during closing that all 
of the elements of first degree murder were present. 
"Intentional, knowing, depraved indifference, intentional 
infliction of serious bodily injury." (R. at 001654). The fact 
is that the evidence did not show any of these elements to be 
present, but rather showed that the defendant was acting under 
extreme emotional distress and voluntary intoxication. The 
evidence at trial showed that the defendant was either 
negligent or reckless or acting in self defense, but the 
evidence did not support a verdict of intent to kill, commit 
serious bodily injury or acting with depraved indifference. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 sets forth the definition for 
manslaughter and reads in pertinent part that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor 
reasonably believes the circumstances 
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provide a regal jusniication or 
excuse for his conduct although the 
conduct is not legally justifiable or 
excusable undei 3x i s t i n g 
circumstances. 
(^) Under Subsecti^ii \±) \±.,, cniotioilal 
d i s t u r b a n c e does not inc lude a c o n d i t i o n 
r e s u l t i n g from mental i l l n e s s as defined in 
Sec t ion 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or 
excuse under Subsection (l)(b), or the 
reasonable belief of the actor under 
Subsection (1 ) (c), shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under 
the then existing circumstances. 
(4) Man s1a i i gh t e r i s a fe ] o ny of t he sec ond 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5-2 0 7 sets forth the elements for the 
crime of negligent homicide and states that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
11 3 reviewii ig 11 Ie evidence presented at tria1 i t is clear 
that the evidence did not support the verdict iii this case. 
There was no evidence that "Marlene intended to kill anyone or 
even intended to commit serious bodJ ' ' -' 5 * ] * 
evidence does not support a finding oi depraved indifference 
J : a the i , 31 lppor I: s • : f f :i 1 1 :i :i 1 1 3 : f = : rti : = 1 : ie eiiioti c 1 lal 
disturbance, mental illness and intoxication which led to 
1: 1 eg 1 ige 1 1 t: : 3 : J : e : k 1 ess • be1 1 avior. >ere was also evidence that 
Marlene was fearful for herself and her family and may have 
been acting in self defense. 
Almost every witness in this matter testified that 
Marlene Longshaw was acting under extreme emotional 
disturbance the day of the shooting. Daniel Hernandez, the 
funeral director testified that Marlene was laying on top of 
the body of her brother Aaron for the entire hour prior to the 
shooting. He testified that this behavior was out of the 
ordinary and she appeared to be very upset. (R. at 000297-98). 
Bonnie Thackeray, the assistant funeral director testified 
that Marlene was glassy eyed and did not seem to know who Ms. 
Thackeray was when she approached her. (R. at 000506). Dorothy 
Greuber, Marlene's mother, testified that Marlene was not only 
laying on her brother's body but when she tried to get her off 
the body Marlene said "no mom, just put me in with him and 
close the casket so I can go with him." (R. at 001107). Lane 
Larson testified that Marlene was also kissing Aaron and that 
he had never seen her act this way before. That she was "very 
very very upset" (R. at 001225) . He testified that when he 
tried to comfort Marlene she kept asking her dead brother to 
just give her one more kiss and it was as though she did not 
even know Mr. Larson was there. (R. at 001226) . Terresa 
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breuoer testified that when she arrived at: the funeral she saw 
Marlene and that Marlene was looking dazed and out of it. (R. 
at, uui^bwj. Tamara Nelson confirmed in ner testimony that 
Marlene was laying over the casket and also stated that 
"Marlene wasn't a] 1 there. She was very distraught and 
Mike Moore testified that In twenty years of knowing Marlene 
:- ;:.;. ikr^j: b-_t_:. :. . d^ •_ i:. _e\ ~L seen ;.ei ij:e she 
was the day of this funeral. (R. at 001358-59). Alicia Patrick 
testified that Marlene was x [v ]ery stressed. She just wasn't 
there. We could not get her to talk or anything. She just 
wanted to lay on Aaron. That's all she wanted to do.'' (P. at 
: :)] 3 9 9 ) - r . - - •. • -. - • - • • . ,.L. , 
Marlene off the casket but was unsuccessful and that Marlene 
kept s a y :i i i • g It: : j: i i I:: 1 I • E J : :i i I 1 1 i E • • : a s k e t a i i d c 1 o s e :i 1: ( ) 
Norman Longshaw testified that Marlene had been a basket case 
since discovering her brother's body. (R. at 001483) He 
further testified that she had not bothered to clean herself 
up for the funeral and was wearing the same clothes she had 
the day be fore (I \ ' H 1 R f.) 
The testimony <.f the witnesses at trial made it clear 
11 i a t M s . I o i I g s 1 I a w - ^ L r u i: L e emotional 
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distress the day of the funeral. This evidence was combined 
with that of Dr. Allen who testified that Ms. Longshaw also 
suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and possibly from 
Borderline Personality Disorder. Dr. Allen, who specializes 
in working with patients who suffer from Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder testified that based upon his clinical interview and 
the administration of the MMPI II, the Pennsylvania Inventory 
and the Shipley-Hartford Inventory that he had diagnosed Ms. 
Longshaw with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). (R. at 
001134-35). Dr. Allen testified that Marlene had a history of 
very traumatic experiences prior to the death of her brother. 
At age fourteen Ms. Longshaw was raped. Rape is very commonly 
associated with PTSD even when it happened some fifteen years 
prior. (R. at 001146). Ms. Longshaw had also suffered from the 
death of her father and more recently the death of her younger 
sister. (R. at 001147). In fact, Aaron's funeral was on the 
one year anniversary date of her sister's death. (R. at 
001148). Ms. Longshaw also witnessed a murder in 1977 and was 
shot at at that time. (R. at 001149). Dr. Allen also 
considered that Ms. Longshaw had been in a fight with a gang 
when she broke up a fight between her son and another boy in 
1994 and later the boy's mother's boyfriend attempted to stab 
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traumatic and may lead to the development of PTSD. (Id.) Dr. 
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scored considerably higher than Vietnam veterans who suffer 
from m e disorder
 rpic^ily score (& usual 
score on the Penn Inventory Test for a Vietnam veteran is 54 
whereas Ms. Longshaw scored a 60. (R. at 001136) Dr Allen 
t e s t i f i e d 11 i a 1: 1: »e s :i de s ] oo k i n g a t t: r ai in ia t :ii : e ve n 1: s he a ] s c > 
took into consideration Ms. Longshaw's account of feeling 
j : • .- -« -
about her spiritual life. Further she had troubling nightmares 
and felt confused about her m ^ . these are further symptoms 
of PTSD. 
n
^. Allen also testified that Ms. Longshaw possessed many 
of the characfer'r*- - rx ^ ir~i-^r p--. ~ •- :r~^^r 
was unable, however, to conclusively diagnose this disorder 
I: -i I t f• E J t :ii t ; ; c .s son L = • 1:1 :i :i i lg tl ia I: i leeded t : 1: = J • : : •] : = ::i :i i I I : :i i i 
more detail. He testified however, that Marlene suffered from 
i nai ly • : f tl n E • z\ laracter is tics of this disorder Including frantic 
efforts to an individuals real or imagined abandonment; 
patterns of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships 
characterized by a 1 t• = rnat:ii i i :j ] :>etween extremes c f :ii dea 1 i zatj on 
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and devaluation; identity disturbance and unstable self image; 
impulsivity in two areas that are potentially self-damaging 
including substance abuse; recurrent suicidal behaviors; 
instability due to marked reactivity of mood; chronic feelings 
of emptiness and transient stress-related paranoid ideation 
and severe paranoid symptoms, (R. at 001192-96). 
Although emotional disturbance does not include a 
condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-305 when a mental condition leads to 
emotional disturbance this should be considered in determining 
whether or not the defendant committed the crime of 
manslaughter. In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), in 
her concurrence, Justice Durham stated that: 
Grief and post-traumatic shock syndrome are 
only two examples of internal mental or 
emotional conditions that can cause 
emotional disturbance leading to violent 
actions. The emotional disturbance is not 
triggered by external stimuli, but by 
internal mental states which may or may not 
have reasonable explanation or' excuse and 
which may or may not raise to the level 
necessary to sustain a diminished capacity 
defense. Other examples of subjective 
mental or emotional conditions which could 
and should be relevant to a manslaughter 
analysis are sleep deprivation, medication 
imbalance, severe anxiety (not amounting to 
mental illness) and physical illness. These 
conditions may bring about emotional 
disturbance-leading to loss of self-control 
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would be appropriate to a manslaughter 
finding under certain facts. 
i3i^uw _. _ griei ./JI lered by Ms Longshaw, combined 
with the PTSD the symptoms of Borderline Personality Disorder 
and the voluntary intoxication discussed above, caused an 
emotional disturbance which lead ---j~."i.~- * T--^br-pf 
this emotional disturbance was reasonable under the 
. ' * --
1
 -• I I MI,1.-) i i i e i ti I- i ' «i I I I I i i q s l i , J s 
past which lead t ; diagnosis of PTSD, combined with being 
L.ne ..:.•_ -. .. .cuiij h^r br o m e r ' s ooay and the normal stress of 
losing - brother, her emotional disturbance was more than 
reasonable under the circumstances. The evidence in this 
matter is sufficiently inconclusive iri J -' -~-~c^ • • •• ; ) • 
t: a degree that reasonable minds must have entertained •:: 
r e a s o n a b ] e • :l : i; ill : !: t i \a t I la r J! < = ' i r E ::<:: >n: u i: i :i t be • :l t i r = • ::i: :i i i: \£ • • : f f:i i : s t 
degree murder. If the jury would have given proper 
cc >i 1 sider atioi I t : • ti iese fac toi: s 11 i.ey cou 1 d i Io t: have reasonably 
convicted Ms. Longshaw of first degree murder and therefore 
this Court should overturn the verdict of the jury. 
There was also evidence presented 
supported a verdict of either negligent homicide or not guilty 
] : •;: > i : e a s o i I • : • f s = • Jl f i = • f • = i I , E; • = • T i I • = • :i : • = i; ; a s • = :i :i e i i c e f i: oi a a t J e a s t 
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four witnesses that Terry Stewart was seen with a gun at the 
viewing the night prior to the funeral. (R. at 001100, 001379, 
001396 and 001425) . Further, there was evidence from two 
witnesses that they believed they saw a gun on Stewart the day 
of the funeral. Tamara Nelson stated that she saw the gun and 
Rhonda Larson testified that she saw Stewart reach into his 
coat and she believed he was reaching for a gun. (R. at 001290 
and 001329). Dr. Allen testified that Marlene reported to him 
that she was in fear for her life and that of her families 
because of the threats and what had happened the night before. 
He further testified that these appeared to be reasonable 
fears under the circumstances. (R. at 001151). Marlene also 
reported to him that when the fight broke out at the funeral 
home she believed that "gangs were coming to kill us." (R. at 
001153) . All of these statements support a theory of self 
defense. Lane Larson testified that when the gun went off 
Marlene had a hold of Stewart's jacket and was trying to break 
up the fight. (R. at 001233). This evidence supports an act of 
negligent homicide or accidental shooting. 
Even though the evidence in this matter was overwhelming 
that Ms. Longshaw was suffering from extreme emotional 
disturbance along with strong evidence of negligent homicide 
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and. ir rlpfpn.sp. l • '' M s 
Longshaw of first degree murder. This conviction resulted even 
1 : 1 ,..<: HI i ijil: : t l : .€ M: e \ ie ., = • rj i : ti Lc ] ] ] * i : : ei n dei ice : f :i i i t e r .t t : ] ;: :i ] ] • : :i : t : 
cause serious bodily injury or f acting with depraved 
:ii i I ::i i f f e r e i I c e . T1 I e i: e • \ i a s i I : B v i d e i I c • e w 1 I a t s o e v e r , d i r e c t : • i : 
circumstantial, that Marlene went to the funeral with the 
intent to kill anyone. There was no evidence that when the 
fight broke out and Marlene took out the gun that she intended 
tc kill or injure anyone. The only evidence that Marlene even 
appear *-n 
from Daniel Hernandez who was not even in *:.•- room at the Lime 
: f tl ie actual si IOC " :•::..;.:•;'. *:-:_.._: >*_- :-_:_ _;-- ctiL-;..:^ :.: 
appeared to be aimin< y. t he direction r.i ~ :IL Sloan and Terry 
Stewar" at 000321 ana w JLO^- L iere was no other 
evidence that Marlene may have been intending to shoot anyone. 
There was however evidence that she was merely attempting to 
brea} :: i IJ: tl r = f j ::]1 i It: 1: • = tween 1 ler 1: r otl ler ai i< :1 TCE rr \ 7 Stev/a r t: The 
state absolutely did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
1 1 a 3 : J e i i < E I i < D i l g s 1 I a \ - :i i I If: E; I I d e d t : • ] :  j ] ] • : :i : :i i i j I :i i : • = a i i y • :> i l e . 
The state also did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Ms, Longshaw acted with depraved indirterence. Tr^ order 
to prove depraved indifference the state needed t : prove 
11 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Marlene acted knowingly in 
creating a grave risk of death, knowing that the risk of death 
was grave, which means a highly likely probability of death, 
and that the conduct evidenced an utter callousness and 
indifference towards human life. Knowingly, or with knowledge 
is defined at Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) which states that: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances, A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
The state in this matter did not put forth evidence which 
proved that Marlene acted knowingly in creating a grave risk 
of death, knowing that the risk of death was great and in 
order to prove depraved indifference murder the state must 
prove both this and that the conduct evidenced an utter 
callousness and indifference towards human life. There was not 
any evidence at trial in this matter that suggested Marlene 
acted knowing that she was creating a grave risk of death when 
she took the gun out at the funeral. Even the two neutral 
witnesses in the case, Daniel Hernandez, and Bonnie Thackeray 
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< • .oove, both of these 
witnesses testified that Marlene appeared to be under extreme 
en LC t:i oi ia ] d i s tr ess at 11 ie timc 01 int shooting. Ms. Thackeray 
testified that she heard Marlene say "back off" two or three 
times and that she appeared to be trying to stop the fight 
between her brother and Stewart. (I1 i (»m r^) l^v H -
testified that she tried to approach Marlene after she had 
taken ' 11 1 a i 1 :i 1:1 I a t 1 1 a r .1 e n e d :i d i I • : I: e \ e • i i ] : i i o w w 1 I o s h e 
was and appeared glassy eyed. (Id.) Mr. Hernandez did testify 
tna* X'ir.!-i;v dppeo:t:<' fining the gun, however, this 
testimony must be tv-ken with a grain of salt since he furtVi-~%' 
i^b . _ •.. „ L:_: .^ . • ii +che room minutes before the actual 
shooting took place. (R. at 000?/ r • v : ~^  
was ample evidence that Marlene was not aiming the gun and was 
desperately tr : .. ^:^i ^nu 
Stewart. (See testimony of Lane Larson at 001222-001252).2 
ra^p- .... ^ypically 
associated with depraved indifference murder. In State 
Kusse^ /* (Utah 1987- -~ which a verdict for 
first degree murder was ^ffirme* " i « •<' Stet- ,.-i i I I 
2
 Mr. Larson''s testimony IJL> VX.XJ V X ^ example ui m e idci r:^t 
Marlene Longshaw was not attempting to shoot anybody. There are 
other examples of this from virtually every witness. 
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concurrence goes to some length in defining depraved 
indifference. In discussing the history of depraved 
indifference murder Justice Stewart states that: 
A third category of murder was sometimes 
called depraved-heart murder. This label 
derived from decisions and statutes 
condemning as murder unintentional homicide 
under circumstances evincing a "depraved 
mind" or an "abandoned and malignant 
heart." Older authorities may have 
described such circumstances as giving rise 
to an "implied" or "presumed" intent to 
kill or injure, but the essential concept 
was one of extreme recklessness regarding 
homicidal risk. Thus, a person might be 
liable for murder absent any actual intent 
to kill or injure if he caused the death of 
another in a manner exhibiting a "wanton 
and wilful disregard of an unreasonable 
human risk" or, in confusing elaboration, 
a "wickedness of disposition, hardness of 
heart, cruelty, recklessness . of 
consequences, and a mind regardless of 
social duty." 
It is this latter definition which emphasizes a "wickedness of 
disposition" which has been most commonly associated with 
depraved indifference murder. Justice Stewart went on to 
discuss that the facts of the Russell case were such to 
support a verdict of murder based upon depraved indifference. 
The defendant told Floyd and LaRue [the 
victims], "If I don't start getting some 
answers, I am going to start blowing 
everybody away." He pointed his gun at 
Floyd and when Floyd attempted to move it 
away, he shot Floyd once in the chin. He 
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then ran outside, and when LaRue went back 
in the house, he shot at her through the 
window. He also testified that he knew the 
gun was a dangerous weapon and was aware of 
the probable result if someone were to 
shoot another in the face. 
State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987){concurring 
opinion). The Court in Utah v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986) 
also upheld a conviction for murder under the circumstances 
where the defendant and the victim were engaged in shooting 
practice and got into a fight. The defendant dove into the 
fight with a knife in hand, kicked the victim in the head with 
steel toe boots and when the victim attempted to get up off 
the ground kicked him in the chest and face. After stabbing 
the victim the defendant fled the scene and was not 
apprehended until later. 
These are just two examples of situations where the 
defendant clearly acted knowing they were creating a grave 
risk of death which evidenced an utter callousness and 
indifference towards human life. This is clearly not the case 
at hand. See also State v. Garcia, 663 P. 2d 60 (Utah 1983) 
(defendant beat victim in head with blunt object and stabbed 
victim fifteen times during a fight); State v. Fontana, 680 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984) (drive by shooting in which witnesses 
saw defendant tailgating victim in threatening manner, revving 
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his engine and almost hitting victim prior to shooting.) and 
State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293 (Utah 1992) (defendant kicked 
victim in the face after victim kissed defendant and then took 
the victim's personal property and when victim attempted to 
get up defendant continued kicking him in the neck and head 
causing his death.). The evidence did not show that Marlene 
Longshaw knowingly created a grave risk of death. There was 
not evidence presented that Marlene was aware of the nature 
of her conduct or the existing circumstances when she 
attempted to stop the fight between her brother and Terry 
Stewart. There was not any evidence that Marlene was aware 
that her conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result 
that it did. The state attempted to argue that the mere act of 
taking out a gun in a public place evidences depraved 
indifference but this is not necessarily the case and the 
state must prove more than this to show that the defendant 
acted with depraved indifference beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The evidence at trial showed that Marlene was acting under 
extreme emotional distress, that she was in a daze and really 
had no idea what she was doing. The evidence further 
established that Marlene did not even know that she had killed 
anyone until she was told this by Officer Gallagher during his 
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interview of her at the station after the funeral. (R. at 
001077). 
The evidence in this case does not support a verdict of 
first degree murder under intent to kill, intent to commit 
serious bodily injury or depraved indifference. The evidence 
on these issues was sufficiently inconclusive and inherently 
improbable to a degree that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of murder in the first degree. The evidence was 
overwhelming that the defendant was acting under severe 
emotional distress and that this distress was reasonable under 
the circumstances. Further, there was ample evidence to 
support a verdict of negligent homicide or that the defendant 
was acting in self defense and was therefore not guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
During closing arguments the prosecutor misstated the law 
calling the attention of the jurors to a matter that they were 
not justified in considering. This misstatement was 
prejudicial and it is likely that there would have been a more 
favorable result in its absence. Further, the evidence in this 
matter was insufficient to support a verdict of murder in the 
first degree and reasonable minds must have entertained a 
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reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. This 
matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 V2^1 day of March, 1997. 
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O The motion of . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
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D upon motion of a State, a Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
Yi r\c>V4fr 
. ,_, are hereby dismissed. * 
TrteWrfrv 
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